BOARD DIVERSITY, INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE by Mohd Amin, Syajarul Imna et al.
Journal of Nusantara Studies 2019, Vol 4(2) 45-69 
Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin 
ISSN 0127-9386 (Online) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol4iss2pp45-69 
 
 
Journal of Nusantara 
Studies (JONUS) 
 
45 
 
 
BOARD DIVERSITY, INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
*Syajarul Imna Mohd Amin, Mohd Mohid Rahmat & Abdullah Khairi Mohd Asri 
 
Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 Bangi, 
Selangor, Malaysia 
*Corresponding author: mohead@ukm.edu.my 
 
Received: 20 Jul 2019, Accepted: 1 Nov 2019 
 
ABSTRACT 
Industry specificity is important to affect board diversity-performance relationship. Prior 
studies are flawed by assuming that Malaysian industries are homogenous, and industry 
peculiarities might not be captured by the aggregate results of all firms in the country. The 
ability of board diversity to boost firms’ performance could be affected by a specific nature of 
the industries. The purpose of this study is to examine the combined effect of board diversity 
on firm performance. We also examined the moderating role of industry specificity on the board 
diversity-performance relationship. Data were collected from 180 listed firms in Malaysia for 
the period of 2012 to 2016 to avoid the implication of the Companies Act 1965 revamp in late 
2016 and the latest MCCG reform in 2017. Data were analysed using the random effect panel 
data regression to test the research hypotheses. The findings suggest that firm performance is 
influenced by the combined effects of board diversity dimensions. The findings confirmed the 
importance of industry effect indicated by the variations of board diversity-performance 
relationship across industries. Other significant factors include firm’s growth, size, and 
leverage. Thus, different industries in Malaysia should utilize a distinguished corporate 
governance framework to improve firm performance according to their industry specificities. 
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The findings of this study contribute to the body of knowledge by expanding the role of board 
diversity in the context of industry specificity. 
 
Keywords: Board diversity, corporate governance, firm performance, Malaysia, sectorial 
analysis 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The corporate governance (CG) failures have preoccupied scholars since the revelation of 
many fraud cases involving large companies over the world, such as Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom in the US, Satyam in India, KMK and Mailyard in China. Exacerbating that the 
episode of economic crisis like the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Global crisis in 2008 have 
renewed the focus on sound CG practice. Pursuant to this, a surge of CG reform has been 
evident cross-countries, including Malaysia. The country has received many criticisms on the 
issue of corporate governance shortcomings (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Che Haat, Abdul 
Rahman, & Mahenthiran, 2008), which led to the introduction of the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) to remedy all corporate sectors in the country. The MCCG has 
taken several stages of revision since 2000, 2007, 2012 and 2017 as pro-active efforts to ensure 
that it remains current and relevant with the global CG standards. While the issue of compliance 
is voluntary, the effectiveness of the CG guidelines in supporting firm performance, in the long 
run, is another puzzle concerning national policy decision makers, industries, and researchers. 
The key to the CG system is the Board of Directors (BoD) who have at least four 
fundamental roles, namely monitoring and controlling management, delivering ideas and 
advice, supervising compliance with related laws and regulations, and connecting firms with 
external resources and environments (Mallin, 2004; Monks & Minow, 2004). However, 
increase documentation of corporate failure has questioned the credibility of the BoD to 
conduct careful supervision on the management decisions (Al-Gamrh, Ku Ismail, & Al-
Dhamari, 2018; Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, Fadzil, & Al-Matari, 2012; Ciftci, Tatoglu, Wood, 
Demirbag, & Zaim, 2019). According to Peng and Jiang (2010), adhering to the BoD’ best-
practice code on documentation may not be sufficient to represent efficient in practice. Carter, 
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D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010) argued that it is the composition of the BoD that matter 
the most in boosting firm performance. A recent phenomenon in the workplace has been the 
increasingly diversity in board composition in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, size, 
managerial ownership and independence (Al-Matari et al., 2012; Ararat, Aksu, & Tansel Cetin, 
2015; Ciftci et al., 2019; Shukeri, Shin, & Shaari, 2012). The board diversity may promote 
better corporate governance control mechanism if all the elements of diversity are coordinated 
efficiently, resulting in improve performance and enhance value creation for the firm.  
The influence of board diversity on firm performance has been well discussed in several 
interdisciplinary theories (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003: Carter et al., 2010; Westphal & 
Milton, 2000; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but in various perspectives, and is mainly on 
developed economies (Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Rutledge, Karim, & Lu, 2016). Emerging 
studies highlight on many different issues, including women participation in the board, 
government ownership and external BoD (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ang & Ding 2006; 
Cho & Kim, 2003; Darmadi, 2010). Studies on firms in emerging countries like Malaysia 
indicate combinations of results between board diversity characteristics and firm performance 
due to many boards demographic factors such as race, religion, culture, gender and many more 
(Alazzani, Hassanein, & Aljanadi, 2017; Abdullah, 2014; Abdul Wahab, Pitchay, & Ali, 2015; 
Bliss, Muniandy, & Majid, 2007; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ismail, Abdullah, & Nachum, 2013). 
The findings are mixed, due to several aspects, including cross-sectional differences in firm 
BoD’s practices. Thus, in promoting better firm performance, hybrid coordination of the 
different board compositions is argued to be a more conclusive and comprehensive measure of 
board diversity (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2008). 
Prior studies also may be restricted; the findings are flawed by the fact that industries 
making up the market are not homogenous (Amin & Janor, 2016; Narayan & Sharma, 2011). 
This scope of research needs further scrutiny, given that industry peculiarities might not be 
captured by the aggregate results of all firms in the country. The ability of board diversity to 
boost firms’ performance could be affected by a specific nature of the industries (Benson, 
Davidson III, Wang, & Worrell, 2011; Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007; Ravina & Sapienza, 2009; 
Uribe-Bohorquez, Martínez-Ferrero, & García-Sánchez, 2018). Against this background, it is 
interesting to explore the board diversity practice and how it influences the performance of 
firms in Malaysia, involving different sectors. Concerning that the issue is addressed limitedly, 
the objective of the study is twofold. First, the study examines the combined impact of board 
diversity on firm performance. Second, it investigates the moderating role of industry 
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specificity on the relationship between board diversity and firm performance. This study 
contributes to the board diversity literature by examining the role of board diversity on the 
performance of firms in six important industries (Consumer, Industrial Product, Construction, 
Technology, Property, Plantation and Trading/ Services) in Malaysia dating from 2012 to 2016. 
The findings of this study contribute to the board diversity literature by expanding the role of 
specificities. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous literature has diverse opinions in interpreting CG. In general, CG refers to the process, 
rules and system by which a company is directed toward achieving its short- and long-term 
objectives. The BoD formed a significant component of the CG system, and it carries the role 
of monitoring, supervising, and controlling the management; and linking the firm with the 
stakeholders and environment (Carter et al., 2010). Therefore, a good CG comprises the right 
composition of BoD since it influences the firm strategic decision-making, leading to a high 
performance (Mandala, Kaijage, Aduda, & Iraya, 2018). 
 
2.1 Board diversity and Firm Performance 
The relationship between board diversity and firm performance has been in the discussion of 
several interdisciplinary theories (Carter et al., 2003, 2010). The Agency theory concerns the 
conflict of interests between managers (agent) and shareholders (principal) (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The conflict arises when managers with superior knowledge and expertise pursue self-
interest rather than the owner’s interest. To minimize the agency problem, the BoD must 
monitor the management to protect the shareholders' interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Social Psychological Theory highlights the importance of diversity in the boardroom as it 
carries behavioural and psychological effects on the decision-making process, resulting in the 
probability of both positive and negative outcomes. For instance, diversity (differences in terms 
of demography, skills, experiences, and values) generate divergent viewpoints, critical thinking 
and innovation (Westphal & Milton, 2000). However, excessive diversity may also create 
conflicts and miscommunication. The Resource Dependency Theory provides the theoretical 
foundation for the role of the BoD as a resource to the firm. The BoD is the source that links 
the firm with the external environment such as information and social networks (access to 
potential suppliers, buyers, public policy decision-makers, social groups), which eventually 
promote long-term prospects. Extension of this theory, Human Capital Theory argues that the 
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leader (i.e. BoD) plays a significant role to determine the future direction. The characteristics 
of the leader (in terms of education, skills, experience, and social networks) are, thus, the key 
to influence firm performance.  
Over the years, diversity in boardrooms has evolved against discrimination by serving 
the under-represented minority backgrounds (Thomas & Ely, 1996). Based on this paradigm, 
good diversity measures different gender and races, board size, managerial ownership, and 
CEO duality. Gender diversity represents the rights of women in the market place as women 
can provide ideas from different angles than men that could lead to lively and creativity in the 
discussion (Letendre, 2004). Carter et al. (2010) postulated that women are not substituting to 
men, but rather complement who carries different attributes and added value. Since women are 
the minority group and usually more of external directors, conflict of interest is less likely and 
thus serve as better monitoring of the management. Besides, women participation on board 
creates a better image for the firm (Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006). Some studies show evident 
that female director contributes more toward social performance (Alazzani et al., 2017) and 
firm performance (Hassan & Marimuthu, 2018). Nonetheless, other studies contend on some 
women-related issues such as emotional unbalance (Tajfel, 1974; Williams & O´Reilly, 1998), 
poor communication and slow decisions (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahren & Dittmar, 2012) 
that decrease the firm value. Other studies found no significant influence of gender diversity 
on firm performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Shukeri et al., 2012; Ujunwa, 2012) due to the 
complexity of corporate and country culture. 
Ethnics diversity portrays positive perception as it symbolizes social justice to the 
community. While proponents of ethnic diversity highlight the competitive advantage of 
different background, ideas and skills developed for enhanced performance for firms in Nigeria 
(Ujunwa, 2012) and Norwegian and Swedish firms (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003), the opposite 
studies argue on the probability of communication problems associated with cultural barriers 
(Shukeri et al., 2012). Studies on firms in Malaysia have provided insignificance evidence on 
the impact of ethnic diversity on firm performance (Hassan & Marimuthu, 2018; Ismail et al., 
2013). It could be in line with the opinion of Abdul Wahab et al. (2015) that Bumiputeras are 
individualistic and more secretive, which cause less communication disclosure. 
The right number of BoD has been a matter of continuing debate. Wang, Chen, Fang, 
and Tian (2017) suggested that an optimal board size in the hotel industry is ten; beyond the 
number will reduce firm performance. Some studies document that board size depends on firm 
size (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998), business segments, age of the firm, and managerial 
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ownership (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). Large boards are argued to bring more excellent 
monitoring and advice (Shukeri et al., 2012), expertise (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), experience 
(Dalton, 2005), social networks, and external resources, and less probability of dominant BoD 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994) that in turn, 
improves the financial performance of the firm (Wang et al., 2017). Instead, a small board is 
favorable because of the effectiveness of working in a small group. Yermack (1996) contended 
that large group not only decrease the speed of decisions but also increase the tendency of 
having free riding and social loafing problems. Individual BoD tends to put less effort, knowing 
the others have undertaken the responsibilities (Dalton et al., 1999). Other issues associated 
with large boards include increase communication problems, difficulties to control the boards 
and to monitor the managers (Jensen, 1993; O’Connell & Cramer, 2010; Yermack, 1996), 
which could develop conflicts.  
Board independence is one of CG mechanisms to reduce agency problems and 
managerial decision. Fama and Jensen (1983) believed that outsiders are less beholden to 
management and thus avoid conflict of interest while maximizing shareholders value. External 
directors, although they have fewer skills to tackle the management in providing advice, they 
have high independence to exercising control. Besides, independent board could have more 
information and expertise in certain areas, thus offering greater coordination and judgements 
(Heravia, Saat, Karbhari, & Nassir, 2011, Shukeri et al., 2012). They also help the company to 
get access to external resources and networks like potential stakeholders along the supply chain 
including the authorities and social groups (Heravia et al., 2011), which enhance the business 
development process and prospects in the long run. In contrast, several studies found that board 
independence is not significant to add value to the firm due to inadequate monitoring execution 
and corporate cultural barrier (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Arosa, Iturralde, & 
Maseda, 2013). Other studies asserted that the presence of dominant internal directors in 
influencing decision-making process could be the reason for the ineffective function of external 
BoD to increase firm performance (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006). 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) emphasized that managerial ownership may result in both 
positive and negative outcomes depending on the shareholders’ rights, as too much monitoring 
can be counterproductive. High ownership may also consequence in an entrenched board which 
prefer self-interest over stakeholders’ interest that in turn, takes a different direction (Jesen & 
Meckling, 1976). Consequently, the separation of ownership from control could be a better 
option. In contrast, Carter et al. (2010) suggested that board ownership results in a more 
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involved board, better monitoring and high corporate performance since they could alleviate 
agency conflicts between managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Some studies 
based their argument on the implication of moral hazards such as managers pursuing their 
interest at the expense of shareholder’s interest (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) and information 
asymmetry (Ezzamel & Watson, 1993). However, there are also empirical findings revealing 
that directors’ shareholding does not affect firm performance (Chiang, 2005; Shukeri et al., 
2012).  
CEO duality exists when the BoD holds a CEO and a chairman position. The 
stewardship theory proposes that CEO duality will act as a responsible guardian of the company 
and encourages ‘pro-organizational behavior’ (Boyd, 1995; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson, 1998; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Sridharan & Marsinko, 
1997). It also promotes strong leadership and confidence that would facilitate quick decisions 
and hence improve corporate value. Tin and Shu (2008) suggested that the practice of CEO 
duality is more effective for the case of a non-family firm since it reduces the monitoring costs 
on CEO-chairperson. From the psychological viewpoint, CEO duality contributes to a better 
achievement because he/she who possess sound knowledge, skills and abilities will offer their 
best commitment to retain the job (Goh & Lee, 2016). Nevertheless, some studies contend that 
CEO duality causes an ineffective monitoring system due to developed conflicts (e.g. Bliss et 
al., 2007; Daynton, 1984; Millstein, 1992). Other studies found that firm performance and CEO 
duality has no significant relationship (Abdullah, 2014; Dalton et al., 1998; Ujunwa, 2012). 
While many studies have examined the direct effect of each board diversity dimensions 
on firm performance, empirical studies are scarce on the interest of examining the impact of 
combining multiple dimensions of diversity into single-board diversity score. The early 
research by Siciliano (1996) constructed board diversity index and compared to numerous 
alternative measures of board diversity like occupational diversity, demographics, size. 
Similarly, Baranchuk and Dybvig (2008) developed a board decision model by incorporating 
various board composition measures such as the BoD perspectives, ideas and knowledge. 
Recently, Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker (2016) developed board diversity index based on six 
dimensions, including both demographic (age, gender, ethnicity) and cognitive (educational 
background, financial expertise and breadth of board experience). They examined the impact 
of board diversity on corporate policies and risk. The findings indicate that greater diversity in 
the boardroom led to lower volatility and better performance. 
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2.2 Board Diversity, Industry Specificity and Firm Performance 
Early research on industrial organization and strategic management suggest that the industry 
structure is the primary driver in determining the variations in firm performance (Porter, 1980). 
The market concentration for firms in a high competition industry is likely to be profitable 
(Porter, 1980, 1996). The industry specificities influence a firm’s decisions, which results in 
different industry-specific-performance between firms (Mason, 1939). The theoretical basis of 
industry-performance relationship derives from the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
framework, which proposes the significant association between market structure and 
profitability. Thompson (1967) added that industry conditions vary by the level of challenges 
and uncertainties, which affect managerial decisions and firm strategies differently. In support 
of this theory, Narayan and Sharma (2011) and Amin and Janor (2016) argued that industries 
are heterogeneous due to different market structure. Therefore, the generalization of the market 
performance results, without incorporating the industry effect, will lead to incorrect 
estimations.  
However, empirical research on board diversity-industry-performance is particularly 
limited. Few studies found variations in board diversity practice depending on industry and 
company size among Scandinavian countries and for publicly traded Fortune 1000 firms 
(Carter et al., 2003). Some studies argued that the level of board diversity varies across 
industries. For example, female directors are more prevalent in service industries like 
technology and healthcare industries (Harrigan, 1981). Whereas according to Kang et al. 
(2007), finance industries prefer male and experienced board members. The study also found 
that BoD independence and age diversity are significantly associated with industry effect but 
not gender diversity. Likewise, Ravina and Sapienza (2009) showed that board independence 
not only influenced by their inner-interest but also conditioned by industry requirements. 
Benson et al. (2011) documented that board governance is more effective in the consumer 
product industry than in industrial product industry. Recently, Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2018) 
found that the effect of board independence on firm performance is greater in industries with a 
robust legal system.  These arguments build the basis for the implication of how the industry 
specificity will modify the role of board diversity on firm performance. Therefore, we 
developed the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Board diversity does not affect firm performance  
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H2: Industry specificity does not affect the relationship between board diversity 
and firm performance 
 
Rejection of Hypothesis 1 implies that board diversity affects firm performance. If the null 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected, the estimated β1 is significant, and the sign of the coefficient could be 
either positive or negative. If it is positive, it suggests that firm performance is improved by 
the presence of diversity in board composition in terms of gender, ethnicity, managerial 
ownership, the board size, board independence, and CEO duality. In contrast, if it is negative, 
it implies that having board diversity reduces firm performance. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis suggests that board diversity does not add value to the firm.  
In the case of Hypothesis 2, the rejection of the null indicates that the effect industry 
specificity moderates the impact of board diversity on firm performance. In particular, if the 
sign of β3 is significantly positive, it shows that the marginal effect of board diversity on the 
performance of firms in Industryi is higher compared to other industries, whereas if it is 
significantly negative, it suggests that the marginal effect of board diversity on performance of 
Industryi is lower compared to other industries. In other words, if the null H2 is rejected, it 
implies that the degree impact of board diversity on firm performance is different across 
industries. Failure to reject the null H2 highlight that the impact of board diversity on firm 
performance is the same for each industry in the country. 
 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
The dataset comprises of 180 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia involving six industries 
(Consumer, Manufacturing, Technology, Property, Plantation and Trading/ Services). These 
industries have been the primary industries driving Malaysia economies. The secondary data 
are retrieved from the published annual report from 2012 to 2016. We select the period of the 
study to avoid the implication of the Companies Act 1965 revamp in late 2016 and the latest 
MCCG reform in 2017. We employ equally 30 companies from each industry in arbitrary for 
the five years of observations subject to the data availability, owing to 900 firm-year 
observations in total. 
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Table 1: Definitions of board measures 
BoD Measures Definition 
Managerial Ownership 
(MO) 
1 – (The ratio of shares holds by BoD to the total shares). 
Higher value indicates less diversity.  
Board size (NUM) Total number of BoD 
Board Independence 
(IND) 
The ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of 
directors 
CEO duality (DUA) 1 if CEO is also a chairman and 0 if CEO is not a chairman. 
CEO with two roles indicate less diversity 
Gender diversity (GEN) The ratio of female directors to the total number of all 
directors 
Ethnic diversity (RACE) The ratio of directors excluded majority race to the number 
of directors  
 
The construction of board diversity score from multiple dimensions is guided by the approach 
used in Baranchuk and Dybvig’s (2008) model. The authors argued that the aggregate effect of 
diversity in board compositions is more accurate to symbolize the consensus needed for an 
effective BoD compared to any single dimension. However, the choice of the dimension is 
based on literature and data availability. Thus, the diversity dimensions in this study include 
gender, ethnicity, managerial ownership, the board size, board independence and CEO duality. 
Our correlation analysis between each of the diversity measures shows that they are weakly 
correlated with one another and thus, demonstrates an appropriate combination of diverse BoD 
to model a single board diversity score. For each board-year, Table 1 presents the definition of 
each diversity measures. To construct a comparable scale for the board-year score, we 
normalise each dimension of board diversity by its mean and standard deviation (Bernile et al., 
2016) like equation (1): 
 
Board diversity = STDZ(NUM) + STDZ(MO) + STDZ(IND) + STDZ(DUA)  
                       + STDZ (GEN) +STDZ (RACE)     (1) 
 
Following previous studies (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2008; Bernile et al., 2016), several 
explanatory variables are controlled, and the board diversity-firm performance relationship is 
analysed based on the following framework: 
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Yit= αi + β1BDit + β2Dindustryit + β3BDit*Dindustry + β4controlit+εit  (2) 
 
Where Y defines the firm’s performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). ROA is calculated by dividing earnings after tax over total assets; meanwhile, 
ROE is based on earnings after tax divided by the firm’s total equity. BD refers to board 
diversity in terms of managerial ownership, the board size, board independence, CEO duality, 
gender diversity and ethnic diversity. Dindustry is dummies for industry of which 1 is for the 
observed industry and 0 for other industries. Industry 1 consists of Consumer and 
Manufacturing, Industry 2 comprises Property and Plantation, and Industry 3 includes 
Technology and Trading/ services. To avoid the dummy variable trap, we drop dummy Industry 
3 from the equation. By including the dummy variable for each categorical data (in our case 
industry) is redundant and will result in multicollinearity problem (one variable can be highly 
predicted from other variables) (Gujarati, 2004).  BD*Dindustry is interactive dummy between 
board diversity and observed-industries. We interact the board diversity with industry to 
identify whether the impact of board diversity on firm performance is the same for industry 1, 
2 and 3. Control indicates the generic firm-specific variables including growth, size, leverage 
and age. α is constant, β is the coefficient of variation, while ε refer to random disturbance. i 
and t are firm and time, respectively. 
Based on previous studies, this study includes control variables that could affect firm 
performance, such as the firm’s growth, size, age, and also leverage. Firm size is measured by 
logarithm of total assets with the anticipation that firm size has a positive relation to firm 
performance as the larger firm has a competitive advantage because of economies of scales, 
market power, growth and profitability (Punnose, 2008; Alarussi & Alhaderi, 2018). Growth 
measures earning growth of the firm, which indicates the good prospects in the future (Al-Akra 
& Ali, 2012: Abdullah, Abdul Shukor, Mohamed, & Ahmad, 2015); thus positive relationship 
with firm performance is expected. Firm age is the years since the establishment of a firm until 
2016. A young firm is less than 50 years, while the old firm is greater than 50 years (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003). It is expected that the younger firm has smaller profit since they have higher 
capital cost and less experience in the market (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2013). Leverage or 
debt to the firms’ assets has a positive association toward good corporate governance to 
enhance firms’ good reputation (Cho & Kim, 2003; Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006). Meanwhile, 
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other studies (Bokhari & Khan, 2013; Saeed, Gull, & Rasheed, 2013) argued that high leverage 
lowers the firm performance due to limited investment opportunities. 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 provides a descriptive analysis of all variables for each industry. It shows that Industry 
1 (manufacturing and consumer) has outperformed the industry-average profitability both in 
terms of ROA (0.06) and ROE (0.08). Board composition for Industry 2 (plantation and 
property) is the most diverse (0.60), followed by Industry 3 (technology and trading/ services) 
(0.5). In terms of firm growth, all industries experienced negative growth during the years, 
especially Industry 1 (−1.21). Size of the firms in Industry 3 is the biggest (21.0) among the 
three, while Industry 2 has the most established firms (in term of age) (38.6). By referring to 
capital structure, Industry 3 is highly leveraged compared to the others (0.4).  
Table 3 shows the correlation analysis between the variables tested in the model. All 
variables are correlated below than 0.5, except the alternative performance measure, which is 
ROA and ROE with 0.83. Since the correlation coefficients are small and below the threshold 
of 0.9 (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007; Shukeri et al., 2012), the problem of multicollinearity is not 
present in the regression model. 
Table 4 reports the random effect panel data regression analysis of the relationship 
between board diversity and firm performance, controlling for several firm-specific factors. 
Based on the ROA as the firm performance measure, it shows that board diversity has a 
significant negative impact on firm performance. A 1% increase in diversity decrease by 15.7% 
of firm ROA. It implies that the combined effects of different dimensions of board diversity 
affect the board’s decision-making, but reduce firm value. Contradict to the argument put forth 
by the proponent of board diversity that diversity can better represent the societies and improve 
decision-making due to creativity and experiences; our findings seem to differ. The negative 
relationship suggests that diversity may lead to increased complexity in decision-making and 
time-consuming due to slower action and response, which consequence an overall lower firm 
performance (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). Board diversity may not improve firm value 
due to weak monitoring roles and cultural barriers, especially in the case of participation of 
outsiders (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Arosa et al., 2013). Moreover, diverse 
board members may lead to less effective governance due to rising conflict of interest and 
agency cost and ineffective monitoring system (Bliss et al., 2007; Daynton, 1984; Millstein, 
1992). Other problems associated with diversity include increase communication barrier and 
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obstacles to coordinate the directors and thereby poor supervising of top management 
performance (Jensen, 1993; O’Connell & Cramer, 2010; Yermack, 1996). It is not surprising; 
therefore, certain companies prefer less diversity of board members, probably due to better 
control and quick decisions to arrive at a consensus.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
ROA ROE Board 
diversity 
Growth Size Age Leverage 
All industries  Mean  0.049513  0.076553  0.489602 -0.757067  20.41584  35.21444  0.361302 
  Median  0.044610  0.074199  0.405663 -0.120934  20.00551  30.00000  0.373118 
  Std. Dev.  0.204760  0.287220  0.209490  46.99161  1.884639  28.69272  0.272892 
  Observation  900  900 900 900  900  900  900 
Industry 1  Mean  0.060989  0.083380  0.429336 -1.213295  19.35004  33.77966  0.331256 
  Median  0.047091  0.070476  0.368759 -0.084973  19.19117  32.00000  0.290045 
  Std. Dev.  0.322540  0.429662  0.161813  81.20198  1.202496  21.17956  0.190780 
  Observation  300  300 300 300  300  300  300 
Industry 2  Mean  0.043974  0.067692  0.579571 -0.734812  20.86146  38.57667  0.344105 
  Median  0.037002  0.059671  0.466549 -0.213895  20.87918  32.50000  0.385095 
  Std. Dev.  0.079995  0.135635  0.259858  9.551325  1.473934  28.94322  0.381112 
  Observation  300  300 300 300  300  300  300 
Industry 3  Mean  0.043861  0.078667  0.459398 -0.337686  21.00839  33.29508  0.407279 
  Median  0.053327  0.096198  0.406390 -0.091437  20.40086  27.00000  0.408796 
  Std. Dev.  0.129976  0.217255  0.160050  7.952116  2.306075  34.05894  0.197177 
  Observation  300  300 300 300  300  300  300 
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
 
ROA ROE Board 
diversity 
BD*Industry
1 
BD*Industry
2 
BD*Industry
3 
Growth Size Age Leverage 
ROA  1.000000          
ROE  0.829292  1.000000         
Board 
Diversity -0.011715 -0.001226  1.000000        
BD*Industry1  0.047461  0.034699  0.001554  1.000000       
BD*Industry2 -0.008484 -0.007129  0.610325 -0.393512  1.000000      
BD*Industry3 -0.043691 -0.024226  0.079773 -0.417768 -0.408154  1.000000     
Growth  0.022460  0.028673 -0.006775 -0.016187 -0.000319  0.009600  1.000000    
Size  0.032386  0.093734 -0.021049 -0.348243  0.101965  0.173535 -0.070902  1.00000   
Age  0.009806  0.024844 -0.015360  0.006535  0.042651 -0.075912 -0.043286  0.23212  1.00000  
Leverage -0.161718 -0.007902 -0.151725 -0.106686 -0.090082  0.084380 -0.032876  0.27894  0.01458  1.000000 
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The significant positive coefficient of interactive dummy between board diversity and industry 
for both industries hint two important notes. First, the impact of board diversity is not the same 
across the three industries. Second, the positive coefficient indicates that the marginal effect of 
board diversity is 0.18% higher for Industry 1 and 0.17% higher for industry 2, respectively, 
compared to other industries. Interestingly, we also found that the firm performance of each 
industry can be differentiated as Industry 1 has significantly 0.06% lower ROA while Industry 
2 has significantly 0.09% lower than the average industries. The findings contradict 
significantly to the earlier descriptive analysis after accounting for the effect of board diversity 
and other controlling factors. 
 
Table 4: Estimated results for board diversity and firm performance 
 ROA ROE 
Constant -0.102589 -0.233239** 
Board diversity -0.156812*** -0.212132*** 
Board diversity*Industry 1 0.182326*** 0.342638** 
Board diversity*Industry 2 0.170220*** 0.287941*** 
Dummy Industry 1 -0.056481* -0.118082 
Dummy Industry 2 -0.086362*** -0.148792*** 
Growth 0.000109*** 0.000235** 
Size 0.012005*** 0.017756*** 
Age -7.21E-05 -1.70E-06 
Leverage -0.140139*** 0.013641 
R-squared 0.47143 0.24114 
Adj. R-squared 0.33162 0.09795 
F-stats 3.371923 1.684088 
Prob (F) 0.000044 0.059180 
Obs 900 900 
Hausman test (p-value) 1.0000 1.0000 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The 
Hausman test is insignificant, use random effects) 
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Two points stand out from this analysis. First, it validates the fact that board diversity and other 
examined factors are important in explaining firm performance. Second, the study is in support 
of Amin and Janor (2016), showing the presence of heterogeneity of Malaysian industry.  
For firm-specific variables, the findings imply that firm growth is positively related to 
firm performance, yet at a minimal significant impact. It is consistent with the corporate finance 
theory that firms with investment opportunities will generate cash flows and thereby improve 
firm profitability. However, considering uncertainties involving economies and political 
environment in the country, the positive outcomes from potential investments could be affected 
at certain degrees. Our findings corroborate with the early studies (Punnose, 2008; Alarussi & 
Alhaderi, 2018), indicating that size has a significant positive effect on firm performance. It 
shows that large firms, with the advantage of economies of scale, cost efficiency, and 
sophistication in risk management will be able to improve firm performance.  
Further, leverage is negatively related to performance (Bokhari & Khan, 2013; Saeed 
et al., 2013). The negative relationship can be explained by the poor prospects for the firm with 
high debt, which could lead to less future earnings. The increasing debt in the balance sheet 
crowds out a cash available to fund new projects, which cause suboptimal investments and 
weak profitability. Besides, a high levered firm with high commitments, i.e. interest payments, 
reduce earnings per share and increase the risk to shareholders return, especially during the 
highly volatile market condition. However, the impact of age on firm performance is not 
significant. The result could be due to several factors, such as competitive structure and the 
technology surge in the market in line with globalization that has to outweigh the benefits of 
being highly experienced and long-time established in the Malaysian market.  
The results in the second column (measuring firm performance using ROE) show that 
the estimation results are almost consistent except for the insignificant effect of dummy 
industry 1 and leverage. The second model provides a robustness check against earlier results 
and thereby validating our findings. In particular, the findings show strong evidence that firm 
performance significantly depends on a combined board diversity dimensions and industry 
specificities. Also, the relationship between board diversity and firm performance is moderated 
by the industry effect. For firm internal factors, we found a significant positive impact of firm’s 
growth and size on firm performance and insignificant impact of age. However, only mild 
evidence can be concluded for the negative impact of leverage on firm performance. 
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
The paper aims to examine the impact of a collective board diversity dimensions (gender, 
ethnicity, managerial ownership, board size, board independence, and also CEO duality) on 
firm performance in the case of six important industries (Consumer, Manufacturing, 
Technology, Property, Plantation, and Trading/ Services) in Malaysia from 2012 to 2016. The 
findings emphasis on the negative effect of board diversity on firm performance. However, the 
relationship between board diversity and firm performance is influenced by the moderating 
role of industries types. The performance of each industry can be significantly differentiated. 
These findings highlight the importance of industry effect, concluding that the Malaysian 
industries are unique and non-homogenous. Other factors, such as the firm’s growth and size 
are found to be positively related to firm performance, while the negative effect of leverage on 
firm performance is weakly evidenced. For the age factor, the effect is not significant.  
The implication of the findings supports the different practice of board composition 
across countries and industries. The significant negative impact of board diversity somehow 
explains why certain companies prefer less diversity of board members, probably due to better 
control and quick decisions to arrive at a consensus. The proposition to enhance board diversity 
as a deliberate choice or forced by the law hence needs further scrutiny in the hand of the 
policymaker. If board diversity is important, then there must be some other important factors 
that need to be examined in future research to testify the findings.       
Nonetheless, the limitation of data restricted to only six industries in one country 
reduces the generalization and scope of the research to only industries in a country that may 
share similar characteristics. It is true since the results may not apply for countries with 
different economies, political, culture, and corporate governance. Therefore, particularly for 
other industries in the country, as well for other countries, comparison analyses could be 
examined to establish the board diversity-performance theory for more robust results. 
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